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KASKY V. NIKE, INC.: A RECONSIDERATION OF
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
At issue is the definition of 'commercial speech' and how that
definition relates to the constitutional protection provided by the
First Amendment. The Nike case represents the difficulty in
distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Courts and critics alike have noted that Supreme Court decisions
on the issue of commercial speech is vague at best and does not
transcend to contemporary times when commerce and public
debate coincide with each other. The California Supreme Court's
decision in Nike v. Kasky affects not only corporate entities, but
also the public in what constitutes 'matters of public concern' that
are protected by the First Amendment. The Court's holding
broadens the definition of commercial speech, which, in turn,
limits First Amendment protections. The Court has taken a
paternalistic approach towards protecting the public against
potential false or misleading speech, an approach that is altruistic,
yet detrimental to society's basic freedom of speech.
Part II of this case note will summarize the status of commercial
speech doctrine by looking at the historical development of the
doctrine. It will highlight the areas of speech that are difficult to
categorize into one form of speech or another. This case note will
primarily comment on the Nike case, which emphasizes the
controversy of defining the commercial speech doctrine. Part III
will summarize the relevant facts, procedural history, prior court
holding, as well as the current status of the case, along with the
strong dissenting opinions, which Nike repeatedly cited in its cert
for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Part IV will highlight the
criticisms and shortcomings of the current California Appellate
Court holding and the need for the Supreme Court to re-consider
commercial speech in lieu of this holding.
333
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II. THE STATUS OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Commercial speech relates to communication about commercial
issues that convey information necessary for public decision-
making, but is not part of public discourse.' Unlike public
discourse, commercial speech is valued for the information
conveyed, and not as "participation in the process of democratic
self-governance. '"2
Currently, the doctrine of commercial speech is vague at best.
Consideration of the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech is speculative. The Court in Central
Hudson formulated a test for determining the regulations of
commercial speech and its constitutionality.3  Numerous
judiciaries have interpreted the regulations for commercial speech
in many different ways. However, the Central Hudson test has
remained the test for commercial speech. With this test, the court
considers whether the First Amendment protects the expression in
question. Expression is protected if it's lawful activity and not
misleading. The second part of the test considers the nature of the
protection.
There is no dominant test, however, for determining what
actually constitutes commercial speech from noncommercial
speech. This lack of distinction is important, for where
noncommercial speech is protected, even if it is false or
misleading, commercial speech is not. For example, whereas
truthful advertising related to lawful activities is protected by the
First Amendment, if the content or method is misleading, the states
may impose restrictions.' Misleading advertising can be
prohibited entirely, but States may not absolutely prohibit certain
types of potentially misleading information if it can be presented
1. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 4 (2000).
2. Id.
3. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
4. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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in a non-deceptive manner.'
The Supreme Court has not concluded on an exact working
definition for commercial speech. Numerous Court decisions have
proven that such a definition among the realm of advertising,
political commentary, and the like, should not be forced. Further,
the emergence of mixed commercial and noncommercial speech in
a society shaped through corporate themes and advertising
emphasizes the impracticality of a working definition.
A. Historical Summary of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Commercial speech first arose after 1976 when the Supreme
Court reversed its deep-seated holding that "the Constitution
imposes no.. .restraint on government" regulation of "purely
commercial advertising."6 In doing so, the Court abandoned the
position that all such speech deserves no First Amendment
protection. Further, the 1976 holding in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., enacted
the theory of the commercial speech doctrine, a doctrine relatively
undefined for purposes of the First Amendment. In fact, more than
two dozen Supreme Court decisions on the subject of commercial
speech have not been able to define what actually constitutes such
speech.
In recent years, the impossibility of identifying the
characteristics of commercial speech has been noted in Court
decisions. In a 1995 Court decision, Justice Steven asserted the
"artificiality of a rigid commercial/noncommercial distinction."7
Further, in 44 Liquormart, a 1996 Supreme Court holding, Justice
Thomas noted that the Court itself has at times stressed the "near
impossibility of severing 'commercial' speech from speech
5. Id.
6. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). Valentine was
overruled in Virginia State-Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
7. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
2002]
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necessary to democratic decision-making."'  The Ninth Circuit
cited Thomas' concurring opinion in a 1998 opinion by stating
"the current debate centers not on whether commercial speech is a
form of expression entitled to constitutional protection, but on the
validity of the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech."9
B. The Gray Areas
Recent court cases have demonstrated how the lines of speech
are blurred and that there is not a "two-level" theory of expression
between commercial and non-commercial speech.'" The Court
must consider the expression and assess the First Amendment
interest at stake, then weigh it against the public interest that is
served by the regulation."
One area of focus involves commercial speech and the world of
science in which sellers express health claims about their particular
products. A concern is that government regulation on a company
or association's advertisement as commercial speech relating to a
scientific debate may quash a company's "full panoply of
protections available to its direct comment on [that] public
issue.""
For example, in National Commission on Egg Nutrition (NCEN)
v. FTC, the Court refused to "be hesitant to prevent an advertiser
from misleading consumers under the veil of important public
debate."' 3 In this case, the NCEN sponsored advertisements to
negate the idea that eggs are unhealthy. The ads asserted that
8. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
9. United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133,
1136 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
10. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 242 (1990).
11. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91
(1977).
12. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
13. Barry S. Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and
the First Amendment, 40 OHIO ST. L. J. 115, 146 (1979).
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"there is no scientific evidence that eating eggs increases the risk
of.. .heart...disease. ..14 The Seventh Circuit held the ads were
false claims constituting commercial speech. This holding, on one
hand, prevents one side from participating in a public debate; on
the other hand, it prevents an advertiser from misleading
consumers by masquerading as public debate.
Another example involved a restriction on cigarette advertising.
R.J. Reynolds, the tobacco company, created an advertisement
entitled "Of Cigarettes and Science" which demoted correlations
between cigarette smoking and health risks."5 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) held that this advertisement was commercial
speech under the factors of the Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
case. 6 In Bolger, the Supreme Court classified a drug company's
pamphlets on venereal disease and family planning as commercial
speech focusing on factors on whether (1) the pamphlets were
acknowledged as advertisements; (2) they focused on the
advertiser's specific products and; (3) the advertiser had an
economic motivation.' Just as in Bolger, the FTC weighed the
factors and classified R.J. Reynolds' advertisements as commercial
speech. The FTC agreed to dismiss the complaint in return for
Reynolds' retraction of all advertising in question."
Further areas of 'gray' include non-factual advertising, in which
the 'advertisement' does not consist of verifiable representations
about a specific product or service. Another area involves
corporate image advertising in which the 'advertisement' does not
refer to an individual product or service, but rather portrays a
positive image of the corporation itself.9 So far these forms of
expression are not completely chilled or affected by government
14. Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 159.
15. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539 (1988).
16. Id. (holding that the advertisement misled the public by asserting that the
government study contained 'credible evidence' rejecting public health
warnings of smoking-related health risks).
17. See Bolger, 643 U.S. at 66-7.
18. See Reynolds Tobacco Co., 113 F.T.C. at 348-9.
19. See C.C. Laura Lin, Note, Corporate Image Advertising and the First
Amendment, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 459, 461 (1988).
2002] 337
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regulation under the commercial speech doctrine.2" The potential
of such a regulation would mean that a corporation would be
deterred from advertising its image. But it is difficult to imagine
that if an employer fails to live up to this image, then an action for
misrepresentation would be pursued.2 '
Yet another gray area closely related to the Nike case involves
corporate commentary, otherwise known as issue or advocacy
advertising, in which expression of corporate viewpoints are made
on a matter of public concern. "Issue advertising constitutes a
unique category of speech.. .sharing certain features of both core
first amendment speech and commercial speech."22  If such
expression were to be held commercial, then the government
would still have to demonstrate false or misleading statements in
the expression. One example of this involves yet another tobacco
company, the Philip Morris Company. The Company conducted
an advertising campaign observing and promoting public
awareness of the Bill of Rights.23 The advertisements could be
viewed as either political or commercial expression. These
advertisements could be viewed as a corporate attempt "to protect
its commercial interests by promoting the 'right' to smoke as a
political debate beyond the reasonable scope of regulation by state
agencies."24  Further, there was no specific product or service
advertised, one of the factors considered in Bolger. However, the
Company did not have any interference from the government in
relation to its campaign.
"Barring abolition of the commercial speech category altogether,
inevitably there will be times when the line between protected
20. Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech,
58 MD. L. REV. 55, 120 (1999).
21. Id. at 121.
22. Mark David Lurie, Note, Issue Advertising, Commercial Expressions,
and Freedom of Speech: A Proposed Framework for First Amendment
Adjudication, 28 B.C. L. REV. 981, 983 (1987).
23. Howell A. Burkhalter, Comment, Advertorial Advertising and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 872-3 (1990).
24. Howell A. Burkhalter, Comment, Advertorial Advertising and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 872-3 (1990).
[Vol. XII:333
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editorial and commercial advertising in claims about the danger or
innocuousness of an advertiser's product will be hard to discern."
The gray areas highlight this unpredictability and the Nike case
sets the judicial stage for trying to discern the line between
commercial and non-commercial speech in regard to corporate
advocacy in an editorial.
I. NIKE v. KASKY26
Nike, Inc. is a marketer of athletic shoes and sports apparel.27
Nike is a multinational corporation.2 ' Nike's marketing strategy
focuses on a strong brand image associated with a distinctive
'swoosh' logo and distinctive slogan, "Just do it."29 In promoting
this image, Nike spends approximately one billion dollars per year
in advertising and brand promotion.3" Nike's promotions include
sponsorship agreements with celebrity athletes, including Michael
Jordon and Tiger Woods, as well as professional and college
athletic teams.
Nike subcontracts most of its manufacturing to companies in
China, Vietnam and Indonesia.3 Between 300,000 and 500,000
workers are employed in the overseas factories that produce Nike
products.32 As of early 1993, Nike has taken full responsibility for
its subcontractors' compliance with local laws and regulations
relating to, among other aspects, minimum wage, overtime, child
labor, working conditions, environmental protections.33
Starting in 1996, several news reports alleged that Nike
25. Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech,
58 MD. L. REV. 55, 121 (1999).
26. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165 (1st Dist. 2000), rev'd 45 P.3d
243 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 14,2002) (No. 02-575).
27. Id. at 168.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Kasky, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 168.
33. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 247-8 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed (U.S. Oct.
14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
2002] 339
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participated in 'sweat shops' in which it exploited cheap Asian.
The media and public interest reports accused Nike of acts such as
"12 hour work days, compulsory overtime, violation of minimum
wage laws, exposure to dangerous levels of dust and toxic fumes,
and employment of workers under the age of 16.""3
Nike responded to the adverse publicity and reports with a
public relations campaign. Nike defended its Asian factories'
practices and standards by negating the remarks about illegal or
unsafe Asian working conditions through press releases, letters to
newspapers, letters to university personnel, and in other documents
for public relations purposes.35 Particularly, Nike responded to a
New York Times op-ed piece that accused Nike of cruelly
exploiting Asian labor.36 Nike CEO Philip Knight defended
Nike's overseas factory conditions in a letter to the editor, which
the Times published.37 Nike also bought full-page advertisements
in national newspapers publicizing an investigative report that
found that the charges against Nike were largely false.38
In April 1998, a San Francisco community activist, Marc Kasky,
brought suit against Nike asserting violations of California unfair
trade practice and false advertising law.39 The complaint alleged
that Nike had made false or misleading statements when it
responded to the criticisms of its Asian labor practices in the
editorials, press releases, personal letters to critics and form letters
sent to athletic directors at colleges and universities." Kasky sued
Nike in violation of California's false advertising law and
California's unfair competition law,4 alleging that Nike made the
34. See Kasky, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 169.
35. Id. at 170.
36. Roger Parloff, Can We Talk?, Fortune, Sept. 2, 2002, p. 102 (referring to
New York Times columnist Bob Herbert's statements that "Nike
executives.. .are not bothered by the cries of the oppressed. Each cry is a signal
that their investment is paying off').
37. Id.
38. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247-8 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
39. Roger Parloff, Can We Talk?, Fortune, Sept. 2, 2002, p. 102.
40. id.
41. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et. seq., and § 17200 et. seq.
340 [Vol. XII:333
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false and misleading statements negligently and carelessly and
"with knowledge or reckless disregard of the laws of California
prohibiting false and misleading statements."'42 Further, Kasky
alleges that Nike made such statements "in order to maintain
and/or increase its sales and profits.. .through its advertising,
promotional campaigns, public statements and marketing....
Nike argued that the complaint must be dismissed because it is
"absolutely barred by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 2(a) of the California
Constitution." The Superior Court and Court of Appeals agreed
with Nike in focusing solely on the issue of whether Nike's
allegedly false and misleading statements were commercial or
noncommercial for purposes of analyzing the protections afforded
by the First Amendment.4 ' The Appellate Court held that Nike's
statements were noncommercial speech and therefore protected by
the First Amendment.46
The Court relied on Bolger in dealing with the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech, which
considered three factors - advertising fonnat, product references,
and commercial motivation.47 The Court distinguished Nike from
Bolger, stating that Nike's communications "intended to promote a
favorable corporate image of the company" whereas the
communications in Bolger concerned specific goods.48  Nike's
communications did not relate to Bolger's characteristics of
advertising format or reference to a specific product. The Court
highlighted the issue of public concern in that the "heart of the
First Amendment protection" lies in 'the liberty to discuss publicly
42. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
43. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165, 170 (1st Dist. 2000), rev'd 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
44. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
45. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165, 178 (1st Dist. 2000), rev'd 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert.filed, (U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
46. Id.
47. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-7 (1983).
48. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165, 174 (1st Dist. 2000), rev'd 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
2002]
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and truthfully all matters of public concern.. .Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to copes with the
exigencies of their period."' 49 Just as the 'exigencies' concerned
labor disputes in Thornhill, the Court here held that the "labor
practices of foreign contractors of domestic companies come
within the 'exigencies' of our times."5 Therefore, Nike's defenses
against criticisms of their labor practices constitute matters of
public concern worthy of First Amendment protection. Further,
the Court noted that the fact that Nike has an economic motivation
in defending its corporate image shouldn't diminish the
significance of such speech.5
The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision in a 4-3 decision. 2 The majority held that Nike's speech
is commercial and therefore actionable under state law receiving
no protection under the First Amendment to the extent that it's
false or misleading. 3  The Court reached its decision by
concluding that the messages in question were "directed by a
commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and because they
made representations of fact about the speaker's own business
operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its products."54
The Court considered the relevant Supreme Court decisions on
commercial speech in formulating a "limited-purpose test" to
categorize speech as commercial.55 The Court's test requires
consideration of three elements - the speaker, the intended
49. First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-2 (1940).
50. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165, 175 (1st Dist. 2000), rev'd 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
51. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165, 178 (1st Dist. 2000), rev'd 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
52. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 256.
342 [Vol. XII:333
10
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol12/iss2/4
KASKY V NIKE,1NC.
audience, and the content of the message." In Central Hudson, the
Court held that commercial speech is speech that proposes a
commercial transaction. 7 Therefore, if the speaker and intended
audience engage in commercial transactions, then they are
engaging in commercial speech. Further, in Bolger, the Court held
that advertising format and economic motivation imply
commercial speech. 8 The speaker and intended audience who are
affected by these factors in speech are most likely to be engaging
in commercial speech. Here, the Court held that Nike satisfies the
first element because the speaker is engaged in commerce.59 Nike
also satisfies the second element because the intended audience are
potential purchasers of Nike's products."
In Bolger, the Court notes product references when considering
the content of the message." Here, the Court understands 'product
references' to include not only price, qualities or availability of
items, but also "statements about the manner in which the products
are manufactured, distributed, or sold, about repair or warranty
services that the seller provides to purchasers of the product, or
about the identity or qualifications of persons who manufacture,
distribute, sell, service, or endorse the product [as well as]
statements about the education, experience, and qualifications of
the persons providing or endorsing the services."62 Here, the Court
held that Nike satisfied that third 'content' element because it was
making factual assertions about its own business operations. 3
56. Id.
57. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 34 P.U.R. 4th 178, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 6
Media L. Rep. 1497 (1980). Electrical utility brought suit in New York State
court to challenge the constitutionality of a regulation of the New York Public
Service Commission which completely banned promotional advertising by the
utility.
58. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-7.
59. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258.
60. Id.
61. See Bolger, 463 U.S. 60 (1993).
62. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 257 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14,2002) (No. 02-575).
63. Id. at 258.
2002]
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The Court negated Nike's argument that its speech was not
commercial because they were part of "an international media
debate on issues of intense public interest."64  The Court cites
Bolger in stating that Nike may not "immunize false or misleading
product information from government regulation simply by
including references to public issues."6 Nike's allegedly false and
misleading expression relate to the conditions and practices in its
factories that produce its products, which is commercial in
nature.6 Further, the Court held that Nike could have discussed
the public matter of economic practices without integrating its own
practices. 7
The Court also rejected Nike's argument that regulating its
speech as commercial favors one point of view over another. 8
The Court reasoned that the rejection suppresses false and
misleading statements, not points of view. The Court cites
Virginia Pharmacy in stating that a speaker that promotes its own
product is "less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear
of silencing the speaker" because the speech is "more easily
verifiable by its disseminator" and "less likely to be chilled by
proper regulation."69  The Court did not consider the issue of
whether the speech was actually false or misleading."
64. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 259.
65. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 260 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575) (citing Bolger, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 68, fn.
omitted).
66. Id. at 261.
67. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 261.
68. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 261 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575).
69. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 261 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy. v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 at p. 772, fn. 24, 96 S.
Ct. at pp. 1830-1) [hereafter Virginia Pharmacy Bd.]. Consumers of prescription
drugs brought suit against the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and its
individual members, challenging the validity of a Virginia statute declaring it
unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of
prescription drugs.
70. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262.
[Vol. XII:333
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The three dissenting opinions stressed the need for the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari of the Nike case and to reconsider the
commercial speech doctrine." First, the dissent argued that
irrespective of Nike's economic motivation, the public has a right
to receive information on matters of public concern and that
Nike's economic motivation is not dispositive in identifying
speech as commercial. 2 Second, the dissent argued that Nike's
speech is not traditional commercial speech as the Supreme Court
has held. Under Virginia Pharmacy, commercial speech is
"speech which does not more than propose a commercial
transaction." 3 The dissent argues that Nike's expression went
beyond that by providing information on international labor rights,
which is a matter of public concern.74 The dissent analogized
Nike's issue with Thornhill5, decided in 1940 yet still good case
law, which held that labor disputes are purely economic." Just as
the First Amendment protects both the employer and employees in
Thornhill, both the consumers and Nike should be protected as
well. Further, the dissent argues that the commercial elements of
Nike's statements are 'inextricably intertwined' with the
noncommercial elements and that Nike cannot comment on public
issues like labor practices without implicating its own labor
practices.77
On July 31, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied a
rehearing of the matter. Nike filed a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, in which the Court will decide in late 2002 or
early 2003 if they will hear the case. In its writ, Nike argued that
71. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 280 (Cal. 2002);petition for cert.filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575) (Brown, J., dissenting).
72. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 264 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575) (Chin, J., dissenting).
73. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 265 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575) (Chin, J., dissenting, citing Va. Pharmacy
Bd., supra, 425 U.S. at p. 762).
74. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 265.
75. Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).
76. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 267.
77. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 274 (Cal. 2002); petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 14, 2002) (No. 02-575) (Brown, J., dissenting).
2002]
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"not since New York Times v. Sullivan has [the Supreme Court]
been confronted with a lower court ruling as profoundly
destructive of free speech" as the California Appellate Court
decision in this case.78  Additionally, public interest groups,
businesses, media outlets and other associations, including the
ACLU, filed a series of amicus briefs on behalf of Nike.79
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECTS FROM THE NIKE CASE
A Wall Street Journal editorial argued that "the rest of the
business community would do well to follow this case, because a
Nike defeat will make everyone vulnerable." In our media-
drenched world, the activists, trial lawyers and politicians know
how to run a campaign of vilification. But surely when the
Founding Fathers passed the First Amendment, they believed they
were ensuring a healthy debate, not stacking it."'" Public concern
includes corporations and businesses. Issues such as global
warming, the environment, human rights and diversity, which are
matters of public concern, relate directly or indirectly to
companies' products, services or operations. There is no getting
around it and corporations should not be restricted from speaking
their mind because they are economically involved.
In lieu of the recent Nike decision, a speaker's inability to
predict which category their speech falls can create a chilling
effect on their expression.82 The Court in Virginia Pharmacy
78. Cert for certiorari -
79. See More Than 40 Media Outlets, Corporations and Associations Join
Nike, Inc., available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz (last visited Nov. 16,
2002).
80. See The Kasky Case is Complex in its History Yet Simple in Context,
available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz (last visited Nov. 16, 2002) (quoting
op-ed, Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2002).
81. Id.
82. See Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech
Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based
Relational Framework, CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (stating that
"speakers.. .might be inclined to steer well clear of an unpredictable definitional
boundary").
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stated that commercial speech's 'objectivity' and 'hardiness' were
the 'commonsense differences' from noncommercial speech.83
"The ambiguous 'commonsense' standard prevents commercial
speakers from knowing whether their speech will be protected by
the Court and discourages the distribution of important
commercial information."84 This commonsense standard, which
takes profit motive, into account, can also be found in
noncommercial expression, including book publishing and news
reporting.
The recent decision signals at least two negative implications to
businesses regarding corporate responsibility. First, global human
rights and environmental practices can be subject to litigation in
the United States. Second, corporations should not publicly state
their social responsibility practices - "this decision sets a
precedent for global corporate social responsibility efforts."85 For
example, as a result of the lower court decision, Nike stated in
October that it would not publicly release its annual corporate
responsibility report. This report summarizes Nike's progress
made in areas such as labor compliance, community affairs and
workplace programs."
The decision also implies a restriction on spontaneous
conversation between the media and corporate officials over public
issues. Lawyers would have to monitor and counsel corporations
on their expression in the public forum, including op-ed
commentaries, to prevent lawsuits. All press releases, letters to
editor, customer mailing, op-ed article and web posting could be
the basis for civil and criminal action. Corporate speakers would
83. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
84. Howell A. Burkhalter, Comment, Advertorial Advertising and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 867 (1990).
85. Nike Case Could Spell Trouble for Corporate Responsibility, Kenan
Institute Expert Says, AScribe Newswire, Nov. 18, 2002, available at LEXIS,
Nexis News Group Library.
86. More Than 40 Media Outlets, Corporations and Associations Join Nike,
Inc. in Urging the US. Supreme Court to Reaffirm First Amendment Rights to
Free and Open Debate, PR Newswire, Nov. 15, 2002, available at LEXIS,
Nexis News Group Library.
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have a difficult time addressing issues of public concern
implicating their business or defending themselves in public
forum. One media critic defended Nike by arguing that "extending
the definition of commercial speech from corporate statements
about publicly debated business operations... is unnecessary.
When a business practice becomes a matter, the media filter and
scrutinize potentially misleading corporate speech and place it into
context." 7
A. What will the Supreme Court decide?
Supreme Court may apply a more consistent First Amendment
analysis to regulations on truthful speech in respect to commercial
speech. Past Court decisions concerning expression by
corporations has "avoided the facile assumption that the
commercial character of the entity from which corporate speech
emanates renders that speech intrinsically commercial."88 Rather,
the Court has considered both content and context of corporate
expression in its analysis. For example, in Central Hudson, the
Court refused to provide full First Amendment protection to the
utility's advertising of energy-saving devices that linked to the
current public debate of national conservation.89 Alternatively, in
Consolidated Edison, the Court recognized the First Amendment
protection for the utility's comments on the public issue of nuclear
power, which the company included in its commercially related
monthly bill.9 The Court has maintained a vision of speech
distinct from public discourse and valued only as information.
"Contemporary dissatisfaction with the Central Hudson test
87. Amicus brief on behalf of Nike filed by a group of media organizations
including the New York Times, CNN, CBS, The Washington Post and the Los
Angeles Time; see http://www.nike.cornnikebiz (last visited Nov. 16, 2002).
88. Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech,
58 MD. L. REV. 55, 92 (1999).
89. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562 n.5 (1980).
90. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 535.
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suggests that this vision is now under considerable pressure.""'
It is hard to imagine an applicable working definition for
determining commercial speech. 'Commercial transactions' are
too broad of a working definition whereas you can find a
commercial aspect to almost any First Amendment case. A case-
by-case basis analysis is still work-able; it may be more
commonsense to refuse a unitary standard of review. In the instant
case, the government could require corporations like Nike to issue
audited corporate and social responsibility statements.
Information relating to labor and management practices could be
disclosed, similar to a corporation's financial statements. False
statements would be punishable in a predictable manner.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no "clean distinction between the market for ideas and
the market for goods and services."'92 The distinction between
expressive and economic activity is interchangeable. The
government still identifies with the importance of public discourse
and public concern versus the need to protect the public from false
and misleading speech. "A Klan leader's vague but heartfelt threat
to consider vengeance against racial minorities may be more
alarming than a slight misstatement of the nutritional content of
retail cereal, but it is the latter that is subject to regulation and
penalty."' 3  But the recent Nike decision may be too much
governmental regulation. At least four Supreme Court Justices
have argued for a new approach to commercial speech in which it
is expression protected like public discourse, yet subject to
regulations that serve individual state interests to preserve "a fair
bargaining process."'94  The Nike case may provide that
91. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 55 (2000).
92. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
93. Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech,
58 MD. L. REV. 55, 147 (1999).
94. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501-2 (1990); see also
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opportunity.
Amber McGovern
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426-31 (1993).
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